Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law
Volume 12
Issue 2 Issue 2

Article 1

5-26-2022

State Crypto Regulation: Competing Priorities Shaping Different
Outcomes
John T. Bender

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjteil
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Tax
Law Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons

Recommended Citation
Bender, John T. (2022) "State Crypto Regulation: Competing Priorities Shaping Different Outcomes,"
Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law: Vol. 12: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjteil/vol12/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal of Technology,
Environmental & Innovation Law by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

State Crypto Regulation: Competing Priorities Shaping Different Outcomes
Cover Page Footnote
John T. Bender is an attorney at Corr Cronin, LLP in Seattle, Washington. Many thanks to Daniel Farber
and Hana Ivanhoe of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, Lucas Buckley of Hathaway &
Kunz, LLP in Wyoming, and the members of the Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental &
Innovation Law Journal for their helpful feedback and suggestions.

This article is available in Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law:
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjteil/vol12/iss2/1

State Crypto Regulation: Competing Priorities Shaping
Different Outcomes
John T. Bender*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“Cryptomania” is approaching fever pitch. Public officials,
practitioners, and investors alike are becoming convinced that what
began as a thought experiment has given rise to a full-fledged movement
that is here to stay. This movement could potentially transform the
modern financial system as we know it.1
Today, crypto assets and related platforms are increasingly being
adopted to store, secure, and transmit massive amounts of monetary value
worldwide.2 Enforcement agencies like the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodity Futures and Trading Commission have
ventured into the fray by employing existing legal regimes to regulate in
this new frontier.3 At the same time, individual states have been at the
forefront of enacting new laws to address crypto and blockchain
technology.
Regulation can shape outcomes for any new industry.4 This
article focuses on legislation in three states at the forefront of regulating
digital assets—New York, Washington, and Wyoming. Each state has
adopted different approaches ranging from liberal to stringent.
Examining each approach can help facilitate an informed discussion
about the best way to regulate the area in the future.
*

John T. Bender is an attorney at Corr Cronin, LLP in Seattle, Washington. Many thanks to Daniel
Farber and Hana Ivanhoe of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, Lucas Buckley of
Hathaway & Kunz, LLP in Wyoming, and the members of the Seattle Journal of Technology,
Environmental & Innovation Law Journal for their helpful feedback and suggestions.
1
See, e.g., David Yaffe-Bellany, The Rise of the Crypto Mayors, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 25, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/25/business/crypto-mayors.html [https://perma.cc/3LK9-A2NA ];
Romaine Bostick, et al., Miami Mayor Seeks Wider Crypto Use After Taking Pay in Bitcoin,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-03/miami-mayor-seekswider-crypto-use-after-taking-pay-in-bitcoin[https://perma.cc/2ZQT-L77T].
2
See Chainalysis Team, 2021 Geography of Cryptocurrency Report, CHAINALYSIS (Aug.18, 2021),
https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/2021-global-crypto-adoption-index [https://perma.cc/9F5P-H7PF].
3
See, e.g., Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, SEC (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets
[https://perma.cc/C9VQ-66DX]; CFTC’s Role in Monitoring Virtual Currencies, CFTC (2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/digitalassets/index.htm#:~:text=The%20CFTC%E2%80%99s%20Role%20in%20
Monitoring%20Virtual%20Currencies [https://perma.cc/YGQ2-UQUT].
4
See Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors 29
(Free Press, 1998) (explaining how government can affect the structure of competitive markets through
various means including regulation).
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Legislators and regulators facing the crypto movement bear the
difficult task of striking the right balance between deterring potential
abuses and fostering technological and economic development. While
the verdict is still out on whether one approach is better than another,
states risk driving away innovation and beneficial economic activity by
overcorrecting. New York and, to a lesser degree, Washington have
already borne the ire of disappointed crypto entrepreneurs in response to
regulatory action over the past few years.5 Meanwhile, Wyoming has
been heralded as a forward-looking and crypto-friendly jurisdiction.6
While some might contend that a laissez faire approach invites fraud or
criminal activity, Wyoming’s experience challenges this doomsday
scenario.7 Wyoming’s approach, albeit far from laissez faire, reflects a
purposeful strategy to attract new business by fashioning creative ways
to ease the regulatory burdens confronting this new technology.8
This essay proceeds in multiple parts. First, New York’s
regulation of cryptocurrency is examined. New York was one of the first
states to regulate in this new area by adopting the “BitLicense,” a cryptospecific framework that requires covered entities to obtain a special
license to operate and maintain rigorous compliance practices.9 New
York’s BitLicense regime has faced steep criticism claiming it has
imposed undue costs that inhibit innovation.10 Second, while
Washington has not gone as far as New York, and thus arguably presents
a middle-of-the-road approach by comparison, the steps Washington has
taken to regulate crypto—which include amending its moneytransmission law to expressly cover virtual currencies—has been the
source of criticism for the same reason New York’s BitLicense has been
criticized.11 Washington’s financial regulator has also actively enforced
state securities laws against entities engaged in initial coin offerings. 12
Third, the discussion shifts to Wyoming, which has been heralded as the
most crypto-friendly jurisdiction in the nation. 13 Since 2018, Wyoming
has passed a series of laws favoring crypto and blockchain technology,
including exemptions from state money-transmission and securities laws
for digital assets and creating special purpose depository institutions that
can offer financial products traditionally offered by banks.14
To close, this essay compares these different approaches and
contends that the regimes adopted in New York and Wyoming reflect
competing priorities that have produced dramatically different legal and
regulatory landscapes. Wyoming has prioritized easing regulatory
5

See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
See Caitlin Long, What Do Wyoming’s 13 New Blockchain Laws Mean?, FORBES (March 4, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2019/03/04/what-do-wyomings-new-blockchain-lawsmean/?sh=14afca875fde [https://perma.cc/VTN8-AXJH] (referring to Wyoming as the “Delaware of
digital asset law”).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200 (2022) for the current regulation.
10
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
11
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
12
Infra notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
13
See Long supra note 6.
14
See infra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
6
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barriers as part of a deliberate strategy to attract the growing
cryptocurrency industry.15 Whereas, New York and Washington have
imposed strict compliance regimes.16 While the delta between these
approaches may set the stage for the adoption of federal legislation,
Wyoming’s experience illustrates that it is possible to fashion creative
ways of lessening regulatory barriers, while maintaining the opportunity
for meaningful oversight.17
II.

NEW YORK

In August 2015, the New York Department of Financial Services
(“NYDFS”) issued its “BitLicense” framework to regulate virtual
currencies. The final framework was a product of a process that had
begun some two years before. In January 2014, the NYDFS convened
for two days of public hearings regarding the regulation of virtual
currencies that featured testimony from academics, private attorneys,
and law enforcement officials.18 In his opening remarks, NYDFS’ thenSuperintendent Lawsky characterized the existing legal landscape as
“akin to the Wild West” that was “not tenable for the long term.”19
Superintendent Lawsky also announced that his department was
evaluating a “so-called ‘BitLicense’ specifically tailored to virtual
currencies.”20 He concluded his remarks by outlining the apparent
impetus behind New York’s future BitLicense regime:
First, serving as a money changer of choice for
terrorists, drug smugglers, illegal weapons dealers, money
launderers, and human traffickers can expose the virtual
currency industry to extraordinarily serious criminal
penalties. Taking steps to root out illegal activity is both a
legal and business imperative for virtual currency firms.
Second, safety and soundness requirements help
build greater confidence among customers that the funds
that they entrust to virtual currency companies won’t get
caught in a virtual black hole. Indeed, some consumers
15

Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Infra note 134 and accompanying text.
17
If news reports are accurate, the U.S. Congress may see activity on the legislative front as early as
2022. See, e.g., Allyson Versprille, Bitcoin-Owning Senator Lummis to Propose Crypto Overhaul Bill
Next Year, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-23/procrypto-senator-lummis-to-propose-overhaul-bill-next-year [https://perma.cc/Y57Z-BD34]. Moreover,
some scholars have advocated for preempting state money-transmission laws with federal law. See Carol
R. Goforth, The Case for Preempting State Money Transmission Laws for Crypto-Based Businesses, 73
ARK. L. REV. 301 (2020) (arguing in favor of federal preemption of state money transmission statutes).
As noted, the scope of this article is limited to analyzing the steps taken to regulate crypto in New York,
Washington, and Wyoming. For a broader discussion of crypto and its regulation in the U.S., See
PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW (2018). See also DANIEL
STABLE, DIGITAL ASSETS AND BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: U.S. LAW AND REGULATION (2020).
18
NYFDS Virtual Currency Hearing, NEW YORK DEP’T FIN. SERV.’S (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140920015531/http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014_indx.
htm.
19
NYFDS Opening Statement by Superintendent Lawsky, NEW YORK DEP’T FIN. SERV.’S (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/20141204133845/http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/lawsk
y_vchearing.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VRL-D229].
20
Id.
16
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have expressed concerns about how quickly their virtual
currency transactions are processed. There have also been
public reports of virtual currency lost – perhaps
irretrievably – through hacking and other cyber security
vulnerabilities. Addressing those issues through enhanced
safety and soundness requirements would be important to
building greater confidence in this technology among the
general public and promoting wider adoption. 21
The final framework, 23 NYCRR Part 200, imposed a special
licensure requirement, the “BitLicense,” that entities engaged in certain
business activities involving virtual currencies must obtain to lawfully
operate within the state. It also imposed compliance standards that faced
steep criticism following the framework’s adoption. 22
A. “Virtual Currency” and “Virtual Currency Business Activity.”
The scope of 23 NYCRR Part 200 turns on the definitions of
“Virtual Currency” and “Virtual Currency Business Activity.” 23 “Virtual
Currency” is defined as “any type of digital unit that is used as a medium
of exchange or a form of digitally stored value.”24 “Virtual Currency
Business Activity” is also defined broadly. It includes (1) the receipt or
transmission of virtual currencies unless it is for a non-financial purpose
and involves a nominal amount; (2) holding or maintaining custody of
virtual currencies on behalf of others; (3) buying and selling virtual
currencies for customers; (4) performing exchange services for
customers; or (5) “controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual
Currency.”25
B. Application and Approval.
Subject to limited exceptions, any entity engaging in “Virtual
Currency Business Activity” must obtain a license from NYDFS.26 Two
categories of entities are exempt: (1) chartered banks that also receive
approval to engage in Virtual Currency Business Activity from NYDFS
and (2) “merchants and consumers” utilizing virtual currencies “solely
for the purchase or sale of goods or services for investment purposes.” 27
To apply for a license, applicants must submit a host of financial
and background information, including two years of audited financial
statements,
FinCEN
registration
information,
Anti-Money
Laundering/Bank Secrecy Act policies, management, and organizational
charts, disclosure of executive officers, control persons, and direct and
indirect owners (each of whom must submit credit reports and personal
21

Id. at 4.
Infra note 134 and accompanying text.
23
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.2(p) (2022).
24
Id.
25
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.2(q) (2022).
26
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.3(a) (2022).
27
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.3 (c)(1)-(2) (2022).
22
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financial statements), a detailed business plan, a description of the
services or transactions to be conducted in the state, as well as internal
compliance policies and risk management programs on a range of topics
including privacy, cybersecurity, consumer protection, anti-fraud, and
internal complaints.28
In determining whether to approve an application, NYDFS must
investigate the financial condition, experience, and character of the
applicant and find that that “the applicant’s business will be conducted
honestly, fairly, equitably, carefully, and efficiently within the purpose
and intent of [the regulation], and in a manner commanding the
confidence and trust of the community[.]”29
1. Anti-Money Laundering and Cyber Security Programs.
Each BitLicense licensee must comply with strict Anti-Money
Laundering (“AML”) requirements. All licensees must conduct an initial
risk assessment that considers “legal, compliance, financial, and
reputational risks” and implement an AML program based on that
assessment.30 Licensees must also maintain extensive record-keeping
practices for every virtual currency transaction.31
Unless subject to federal reporting requirements, licensees must
report all virtual currency transactions to NYDFS within 24 hours of
completion.32 Licensees must monitor transactions for criminal activity
and must file Suspicious Activity Reports (”SARs”) per applicable
federal law.33 Licensees must implement a “know your customer”
(“KYC”) program that includes policies and practices for proof of
account holders, enhanced due diligence for foreign entities, verification
of identity for any transactions over $3,000, and a prohibition of dealing
with “foreign shell entities.” 34
Licensees must also maintain a cybersecurity program to ensure
their systems’ “availability and functionality” and protect “any sensitive
data on those systems from unauthorized access, use, or tampering.”35
Specifically, licensees must implement a written policy, approved
annually by its board, addressing 13 prescribed cyber security
principles.36 Licensees must employ a Chief Information Security
Officer responsible for “overseeing and implementing” the program and
submitting annual cyber security reports to NYDFS. 37 Licensees must
also carry out regular vulnerability and penetration testing and maintain
an adequate audit trail system that tracks and maintains data in a manner
28

See Id.
Id.
30
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.15(b) (2022).
31
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.15(e) (2022).
32
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.15(e)(2) (2022).
33
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.15(e)(3)(i) (2022).
34
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.15(h) (2022). For background into what “KYC” programs
entail, See Dan Ryan, FinCEN: Know Your Customer Requirements, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON
CORP. GOV. (Feb. 7, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07/fincen-know-your-customerrequirements/[https://perma.cc/5ML9-WRHG].
35
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.16(a) (2022).
36
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.16(b) (2022).
37
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.16(c) (2022).
29
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that “allows accurate and complete reconstruction of all financial
transactions and accounting,” and protects the integrity of data,
hardware, and systems “from alteration and tampering.” 38
2. Customer Disclosures.
The BitLicense regime imposes specific disclosure requirements
on all licensees. Licensees must disclose to their customers clearly and
conspicuously “all material risks associated with its products, services,
and activities and virtual currency generally[.]”39 The regulation
mandates a series of minimum risk disclosures that must be provided to
all customers when either opening a new account or at the time of the
initial transaction. The mandate also requires disclosures addressing the
fact that virtual currencies are not a legal tender backed or insured by the
government, regulatory changes may impact its use or value, losses from
“fraudulent or accidental transactions” might not be recovered, and that
transactions are subject to an increased risk of cyber-attack or fraud.40
Licensees are must various other disclosures to customers when
opening an account or executing transactions.41 These disclosures must be
acknowledged by the customer, and licensees must provide receipts to
customers containing mandatory information identifying and describing
each transaction.42 Licensees must also take “reasonable steps to detect
and prevent fraud, including by establishing and maintaining a written
anti-fraud policy.”43
3. Material Changes, Change-of-Control, and Mergers.
Licensees must obtain pre-approval from NYDFS for material
changes to their business activities and change-of-control or merger
transactions. In particular, licensees must obtain NYDFS approval “for
any plan or proposal to introduce or offer a materially new product,
service, or activity, or make a material change to an existing product,
service, or activity involving New York or New York Residents.” 44 The
regulation provides open-ended guidance on the definition of materiality
in this context.45
In the change-of-control context, an individual or entity seeking
to obtain “control” of a licensee, which is defined as having the direct or
indirect power to influence management decisions or policies, must
submit a written application with NYDFS for approval. 46 NYDFS
considers “the public interest and the needs and convenience of the
public” when determining whether to approve the transaction. 47 Mergers
38

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.16(c)(1)-(2) (2022).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.19(a) (2022).
40
Id.
41
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.19(c) (2022).
42
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.19(d)-(e) (2022).
43
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.19(g) (2022).
44
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.10(a) (2022).
45
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.10(b) (2022).
46
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.11(a) (2022).
47
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.11(a)(5) (2022).
39
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and acquisitions are subject to similar requirements. The merging or
acquiring entity must submit a written application to NYDFS, and
NYDFS must consider “the public interest and the needs and
convenience of the public” when determining whether to approve the
transaction.48
4. Examinations and Reporting.
The BitLicense regime imposes extensive reporting and
examination obligations on licensees, including financial reporting on a
quarterly and annual basis, akin to traditional financial institutions.49
Licensees are also required to submit “special reports” to NYDFS upon
request and must “immediately” notify NYDFS “upon the discovery of
any violation or breach of law, rule, or regulation.”50
In addition, licensees must “permit and assist” NYDFS “to
examine the Licensee whenever in [NYDFS’s] judgment such
examination is necessary or advisable, but not less than once every two
calendar years[.]”51 Areas of potential NYDFS inquiry include but are
not limited to, the licensee’s general financial condition; “safety and
soundness of the conduct of its business;” management policies;
compliance with laws, rules, or regulations; and “such other matters as
[NYDFS] may determine[.]”52 Licensees must also assist NYDFS in the
regular inspection of the licensee’s books and records.53
5. Enforcement.
NYDFS may suspend or revoke a licensee for failure to comply
with the regime’s requirements, “for good cause shown,” or for failure
to pay a judgment. 54 The regulation defines “good cause” as “when a
Licensee has defaulted or likely to default in performing its obligations
or financial engagements or engages in unlawful, dishonest, wrongful,
or inequitable conduct or practices that may cause harm to the public.” 55
However, NYDFS may only revoke or suspend a license after notice is
given and a hearing is held, and any order suspending or revoking a
license must “state the grounds upon which it is based[.]”56
NYDFS may also petition a court for a preliminary injunction
“deemed in the public interest” to restrain a licensee’s violation of the
regulation or other applicable law.57 The regulation also provides that

48

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.11(b)(3) (2022).
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.14(a)-(b) (2022).
50
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.14(e) (2022).
51
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.13(a) (2022).
52
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.13(a)(1)-(5) (2022).
53
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.13(b)-(c) (2022).
54
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.6(c) (2022).
55
Id.
56
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.6(d) (2022).
57
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.6(e) (2022).
49
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NYDFS is not precluded from investigating or enforcing any other
applicable laws, rules, or regulations against a licensee.58
III.

WASHINGTON

While Washington has not gone as far as New York in regulating
virtual currencies, the steps Washington has taken to regulate in this area
have been consequential. These include amending its Uniform Money
Services Act to expressly cover virtual currency as well as the
Washington State Department of Financial Institutions (“DFI”) actively
enforcing state securities law against ICOs.
A. Amendment of Uniform Money Services Act.
In 2017, Washington amended its Uniform Money Services Act
to include virtual currencies within the scope of the state’s money
transmission laws.59 As a result, businesses that receive or transmit
virtual currencies to third parties, such as cryptocurrency exchanges,
must obtain a money-transmitter license and comply with the statute’s
other requirements, which now include several virtual currency-specific
provisions.60
The amended statute defines “virtual currencies” broadly as “a
digital representation of value used as a medium of exchange, a unit of
account, or a store of value, but does not have legal tender status as
recognized by the United States government.” 61 Excluded from the
definition of “money transmission” are units of value “that are issued in
affinity or rewards programs that cannot be redeemed for either money
or virtual currencies” or “units of value that are used solely within online
gaming platforms that have no market or application outside of the
gaming platforms.”62
Obtaining a license under the statute requires significant
disclosures by the prospective licensee about the nature of its business
and its financial condition. Specifically, applicants must define the
proposed services to be offered and disclose audited financial statements
as well as the personal and financial histories of owners and other key
members of the organization.63 Additionally, virtual currency businesses
58

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23§ 200.6(f) (2022). While the NYDFS has authority to enforce
violations of the BitLicense regime, the extent to which it has exercised such authority to date is unclear.
By contrast, the New York Attorney General has prosecuted several enforcement actions against crypto
platforms and issuers for violations of state securities laws. See, e.g., Press Release: Attorney General
James Directs Unregistered Crypto Lending Platforms to Cease Operations in New York, Announces
Additional Investigations, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL (Oct. 18, 2021),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-directs-unregistered-crypto-lendingplatforms-cease [https://perma.cc/C3JU-ZBNL].
59
Other states that have also amended their state money transmitter statutes to cover cryptocurrency
include Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Vermont. And several states
including Colorado and Oregon have interpreted existing state law to cover crypto assets. For further
discussion about these state amendments or states that have issued agency guidance interpreting their
existing money transmitter laws to cover crypto, See Goforth, Preempting Statement Money
Transmission Laws, 73 ARK. L. REV. at 327-36.
60
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(18) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.030 (2017).
61
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(30) (2017).
62
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(18) (2017).
63
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.040(1)-(2), (4) (2017).
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must now “obtain a third-party party security audit of all electronic
information and data systems acceptable to the director” and provide the
results of such audit.64 All applicants for a money transmission license
are also subject to an investigation by Washington’s DFI into the
applicant’s “financial condition and responsibility, financial and
business experience, competence, character, and general fitness.” 65
If approved, licensees are subject to annual and periodic
reporting requirements. Among other things, licensees must submit their
most recent audited financial statements and descriptions of any material
changes on an annual basis and notify DFI of any material changes
within 30 days. 66 DFI has the authority to conduct investigations or
examinations of a licensee “for the purpose discovering violations of this
chapter or rules adopted under this chapter, discovering unsafe and
unsound practices, or securing information lawfully required.” 67
Licensees must also comply with all federal suspicious transaction and
money laundering requirements and maintain copies of all such records
and reports.68
In addition, licensees must obtain pre-approval from DFI for any
change-of-control transactions. DFI will only approve such transactions
if it finds that “the person, or group of persons, requesting approval
meets the criteria for licensing” and that “the public interest will not be
jeopardized by the change of control.”69 Licensees also are required to
maintain sufficient permissible investments to cover the average daily
sum of outstanding money transmissions; licensees transmitting virtual
currencies must also maintain the same volume of “like-kind virtual
currencies” to cover the volume “obligated to consumers.” 70
The 2017 amendment also added a provision imposing
mandatory disclosures on licensees transmitting virtual currencies.
Specifically, the law now requires disclosure of the licensee’s liability
for “unauthorized, mistaken, or accidental transfers” and a description of
“the user's responsibility for providing notice of such mistake to the
licensee and of general error-resolution rights applicable to any
transaction” and any other disclosures required by DFI rules.71
B. Enforcement of state securities laws.
In the absence of legislative intervention, Washington’s DFI has
filled the void by actively enforcing state securities laws against
businesses conducting initial coin offerings (“ICOs”). 72
64

WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.040(5) (2017).
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.070(1) (2017).
66
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.150(2) (2017).
67
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.130(1)-(2) (2017).
68
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.180 (2017).
69
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.160(1)-(3) (2003).
70
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.200(1) (2017).
71
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.370 (2017).
72
In April 2019, DFI issued agency guidance concluding that state and federal securities laws commonly
apply to the offer and sale of tokens or digital assets in ICOs. See Digital Assets and Securities Laws,
WASHINGTON DEP’T. OF FIN. INST. (April 3, 2019), https://dfi.wa.gov/sites/default/files/digital-assets65
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For example, in January 2021, DFI published a Consent Order
in an action brought against Dragonchain, Inc., regarding claims that the
Bellevue, Washington-based blockchain platform failed to register a
2017 ICO that allegedly raised $12.7 million from 5,000 investors. 73 The
alleged purpose of the ICO was to “develop Dragonchain’s business and
compensate Dragonchain’s employees.”74 DFI alleged that the
purchasers were predominantly passive investors whom the firm
allegedly did not screen to determine their accreditation.75 According to
DFI, the company made various statements suggesting that the value of
its tokens would increase over time, and told purchasers they would
receive discounted prices on tokens offered by startup companies that
used Dragonchain as an incubator.76 The discount program was later
disbanded.77 The company agreed to pay a $50,000 fine and $10,000 in
investigative costs to resolve the action.78
In September 2020, DFI published a Consent Order concerning
Unikrn, Inc.’s $47 million offering of “UKG,” a virtual currency that the
company created for use on its esports betting platform. 79 According to
DFI, Unikrn represented to customers that the funds would be used “for
the ongoing development of the [Unikrn] platform and associated opensource software tools for users and developers to leverage the
platform.”80 DFI alleged that Unikrn made statements that created a
reasonable expectation on the part of purchasers that purchasing UKG
would return a profit.81 For example, Unikrn’s marketing of UKG to presale investors included statements that the value of the token would
appreciate as “turnover and betting volume of UKG on our platform”
increased.82 DFI also took issue with public remarks by Unikrn’s CEO,
stating, among other things, that “[i]t is very important for us to create a
stable ecosystem and stable token so that over time, when we add more
features and more people start using the platform and when we can

securities-laws.pdf. In so doing, DFI adopted a position that tracked that of the SEC. See supra note 2 and
accompany text (SEC guidance). DFI’s 2019 Guidance states “[t]he definition of security under the
Securities Act of Washington [in particular] is well established and very broad.” Washington has adopted
not only the so-called Howey test for a security (which considers whether there is an investment of
money in a common enterprise with the expectation of sharing profits derived from the efforts of others,
see SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)) as well as the “risk capital test,” which does not
require an expectation of profit sharing, but only an expectation of some valuable benefit without
managerial control. See RCW 21.20.005(17)(a). The risk capital test has been criticized as ambiguous,
especially with respect to the degree of risk necessary to qualify as a security. See James D. Cox, et al.,
Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials, at 34 (9th ed. 2020).
73
In re Dragonchain, Inc., Order No. S-18-2433-21-CO01, (Wash. Dep’t of Fin. Inst. filed Jan. 26, 2021)
https://dfi.wa.gov/documents/securities-orders/S-18-2433-21-CO01.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM6NRHM8].
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Id. at 2.
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Id. at 6.
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Id. at 6.
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In re Unikrn, Order No. S-18-2441-20-CO01, (Wash. Dep't. of Fin. Inst. filed Sept. 24, 2020),
https://dfi.wa.gov/documents/securities-orders/S-18-2441-20-CO01.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7CX-EY9W].
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Id. at 4-5.
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Id. at 2.
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further justify the value as that grows.”83 Unikrn agreed to pay DFI a fine
of $300,000 plus investigative costs to resolve the case. 84
In February 2020, DFI published a Consent Order with RChain
Cooperative, a Washington cooperative association operating a
blockchain network with over 1,700 global members. 85 DFI alleged that
RChain raised $30 million through offerings of its “RHOC” token that it
issued and distributed using the Ethereum blockchain.86 The first
offering limited participation to members and had a minimum purchase
amount of $50,000 at $0.20 per token.87 The alleged purpose was to
“facilitate the provision, creation, execution, and maintenance of
scalable decentralized applications . . . within the RChain blockchain
network.”88 RChain increased the per-token price to $0.35 in its second
offering while lowering the minimum purchase limit to $10,000. 89 Over
few days, the closing price of RHOC allegedly rose as high as $2.42, and
its daily trading volume reached more than 5 million tokens. 90 DFI found
that RChain had failed to make various material disclosures in
connection with these offerings, including disclosing information about
key personnel and the purpose of the funds it ultimately raised.91
In December 2019, DFI filed a Statement of Charges against
Duber Technologies, a Washington company formed to develop and
operate a digital platform to connect cannabis sellers with consumers. 92
According to DFI, in 2017, the company announced plans to expand
operations by raising $100 million through the sale of a digital token that
would be used as a medium of exchange across its platform. 93 Customers
were allegedly told they would receive tokens in exchange for creating
content, providing customer reviews, referring new customers to the
platform, making loyalty purchases from retailers on the platform, and
participating in the company’s marketing program. 94 The company also
stated that consumers could use the token to purchase cannabis from
retailers.95 While it is unclear how many tokens the company sold, DFI
alleged that purchasers never received their tokens, but rather a “Simple
Agreement for Future Tokens.”96 Additionally, midway through the
offering, the company announced that it would discontinue the sale and
issue purchasers a refund.97 In the Statement of Charges, DFI asserted
that both the offer for sale and the offer of rescission were securities
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Id. at 11.
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In re RChain Cooperative, No. S-18-2463-20-CO01 (Wash. Dep't of Fin. Inst. filed Feb. 28, 2020),
https://dfi.wa.gov/documents/securities-orders/S-18-2463-20-CO01.pdf[https://perma.cc/5EM2-CHWL].
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In re Duber Technologies, No. S-18-2475-19-SC01 (Wash. Dep't of Fin. Inst. filed Dec. 18, 2019),
https://dfi.wa.gov/documents/securities-orders/S-18-2475-19-SC01.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK8R-7DT3].
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transactions that required registration—and that the company had failed
to disclose certain details material to the offering, including an alleged
$50 million acquisition of cannabis distribution centers located in
multiple western states.98
IV.

WYOMING

Between 2018 and 2019, Wyoming enacted 13 bills focused on
crypto and blockchain technology.99 As discussed in more detail below,
the Wyoming legislature has carried out a deliberate strategy of
encouraging the growing crypto sector to flock to their state by taking
affirmative steps to clarify the rules of the road affecting the industry. 100
A. Exemption to Wyoming Money Transmitter Act.
Wyoming’s legislature amended the Wyoming Money
Transmitter Act in 2018 to exempt businesses engaged in virtual
currency transactions.101 Proponents of exempting crypto from state
money transmitter laws have contended that this step is warranted
because crypto differs substantially from the conventional money
transmission services traditionally offered by companies such as
PayPal.102 Under Wyoming’s amended law, the term “virtual currency”
is defined broadly to include “any type of digital representation of value
that: (A) is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or storage of
value; and (B) is not recognized as legal tender by the United States
government.”103 The statutory exemption provides that the WMTA does
not apply to “[b]uying, selling, issuing, or taking custody of payment
98

Id. at 3-4.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Since then, Wyoming also adopted the first statute
recognizing the legal status of decentralized autonomous organizations or “DAOs.” See WS 17-31-101.
The contours of this statute are beyond the scope of this article.
100
Jed Pressgrove, Wyoming Continues to Pursue a Future with Blockchain, GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 10,
2019), https://www.govtech.com/products/wyoming-continues-to-pursue-a-blockchain-heavy-future.html
[https://perma.cc/P75S-B7MT] (quoting Tyler Lindolm, former co-chair of Wyoming’s Blockchain Task
Force, as stating, “You don’t have to adopt our laws verbatim, but you should be looking at the situation
and realizing that technology is moving much faster than government, which is normal . . . So we’re
playing a catch-up game right now, and without clarity or legal precedence, your companies will exit
your state. And it’ll be my goal to take them away from these other governments.”). By all accounts,
Wyoming’s efforts to attract crypto businesses to its state has been successful. See Elena Botella,
Wyoming Wants to be the Crypto Capital of the U.S., SLATE (June 28, 2021),
https://slate.com/technology/2021/06/wyoming-cryptocurrencylaws.html#:~:text=The%20state's%20rally%20to%20become,2019%2C%20have%20partially%20set%2
0up [https://perma.cc/3Q66-53QP].
101
In 2017, New Hampshire also amended its money transmitter statute to exempt virtual currencies. The
amended law excludes from the applicable definition “[p]ersons who engage in the business of selling or
issuing payment instruments or stored value solely in the form of convertible virtual currency or receive
convertible virtual currency for transmission to another location.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-G:3
(2017). Additionally, several states including Illinois have interpreted their existing money transmission
laws as excluding cryptocurrency. See Ill. Dep't of Fin. and Prof. Reg., Digital Currency Regulatory
Guidance (June 13, 2017), https://www.idfpr.com/Forms/DFI/CCD/IDFPR%20%20Digital%20Currency%20Regulatory%20Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/685Z-YR3F].
102
For an excellent discussion of the legal and policy arguments in favor of exempting crypto from state
money transmission laws, See Carol R. Goforth, The Case for Preempting State Money Transmission
Laws for Crypto-Based Businesses, 73 ARK. L. REV. 301 (2020) (contending that state money
transmission laws have been construed broadly to cover business activities that differ substantially from
conventional money transmission such as crypto-based businesses, and that the patchwork of inconsistent
state laws favoring market incumbents such as banks).
103
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-22-102(a)(xxii) (2021).
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instruments or stored value in the form of virtual currency or receiving
virtual currency for transmission to a location within or outside the
United States by any means.”104
B. Open Blockchain Token Exemption to Securities Laws.
Under the Wyoming Utility Token Act of 2018, businesses and
individuals that sell, develop, or exchange “open blockchain tokens” for
consumptive purposes are shielded from Wyoming’s state securities laws
so long as they file notice with the secretary of state and pay a fee.105
Exempting certain tokens from securities laws provides clarity to an area
fraught with risk based, at least in part, on the broad analytical
framework applied to the question of transactions subject to state and
federal securities laws.106
To qualify as an “open blockchain token,” the Wyoming law
requires (1) that the “predominant purpose” of the token be
“consumptive,” i.e. exchangeable for receipt of goods or services; (2)
that the developer not market the token as a “financial investment” to
the initial buyer; and (3) at least one of the following: (i) that the token
have a consumptive purpose available at or near the time of sale, and that
the seller take “reasonable precautions” to ensure buyers are not
acquiring buying the token as an investment, (ii) that the seller or
developer reasonably believe that it sold the token to the initial buyer for
a consumptive purpose at the time of sale, or (iii) that the initial buyer of
the token be “prohibited from reselling the token until the token is
available to be used for a consumptive purpose.” 107
C. Financial Technology Sandbox.
Wyoming passed the Financial Technology Sandbox Act in
2019. Under this law, the state may exempt companies developing an
“innovative financial product or service” from certain state laws for up
to two years.108 Wyoming’s Division of Banking has explained that the
purpose of the law is “to allow individuals and companies with new ideas

104

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-22-102(a)(vi) (2021).
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-106(c) (2021).
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See, e.g., Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, SEC (April 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets
[https://perma.cc/685E-SUQ2]. The discussion ahead regarding Washington state’s regulation of
cryptocurrency through agency enforcement and the different tests applied in Washington as to the
existence of a security illustrates these risks.
107
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-106(b) (2021).
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-29-103(a). The statute defines “Financial product or service” and “innovative”
separately, but in essence it means a new or emerging technology that provides a novel product or service
in the areas of banking, securities, consumer credit or money transmission. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §4029-102(iv), (vi).WS 40-29-103(a). The statute defines “Financial product or service” and “innovative”
separately, but in essence it means a new or emerging technology that provides a novel product or service
in the areas of banking, securities, consumer credit or money transmission. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §4029-102(iv), (vi).
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to bring their product or service to market in a supportive environment
that facilitates collaboration, consumer protection and innovation.” 109
Notably, the program is only available to Wyoming-based
companies and does not extend to state consumer protection or criminal
laws.110 As a result, all individuals who are “substantially involved” in
the “development, operation or management” of the project must consent
to a criminal background check.111 The law requires the state to consider
various factors, including the nature of the product or service and risk to
consumers.112 An applicant that receives approval must post a “consumer
protection bond” of at least $10,000 to cover consumer losses. 113
Additionally, the banking commissioner and secretary of state have
authority to revoke the authorization under certain conditions, such as a
violation of the statute or any rule, order or decision. 114 The Financial
Technology Sandbox Act is yet another example of Wyoming’s early
efforts to attract and promote innovation by decreasing the regulatory
burden on crypto and blockchain-based businesses.
D. Special Depository Institution Act.
Wyoming adopted the Special Purpose Depository Institution
Act in 2019, which created a new form of financial institution specific to
virtual currencies.115 These Special Purpose Depository Institutions
(“SPDIs”) are authorized to engage in activity “incidental to the business
of banking” such as (1) custodial, safekeeping, and asset servicing, (2)
investment adviser, investment company, and broker-dealer activities,
(3) fiduciary powers, (4) receiving deposits, and (5) other commissionerapproved incidental activities.“116 While SPDIs may have customers and
open branches outside of Wyoming, they may not make loans and must
be headquartered in Wyoming.117 SPDIs must maintain liquid assets
sufficient to cover 100% of their depository liabilities.118
The SPDIA empowers the state banking commissioner to
monitor chartered SPDIs and imposes ongoing reporting and
examination requirements to facilitate such monitoring. Specifically, the
banking commissioner may request special reporting from an SPDI to
monitor its financial condition.119 The law also requires the banking
109

Financial Technology Sandbox, WYOMING DIV. OF BANKING,
https://wyomingbankingdivision.wyo.gov/banks-and-trust-companies/financial-technology-sandbox
[https://perma.cc/QB4P-6NYR].
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-29-104(h) (2021).
114
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-29-107 (2021).
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As of August 2021, Wyoming remained the only state that had passed such a law. However, the
Illinois legislature is considering analogous legislation that would allow chartered trust entities to engage
in the business of banking tailored to digital assets. Patrick Andriesen, Illinois May Become 2nd State
Allowing Financial Services Run on Cryptocurrency, ILLINOIS POLICY,
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-may-become-2nd-state-allowing-financial-services-run-oncryptocurrency/[https://perma.cc/W87F-DKZ3].
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-12-103(b)(vii).
117
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-12-103(c)-(f).
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commissioner to examine “the condition and resources” of an institution,
“the mode of managing institution affairs and conducting business, the
actions of officers and directors in the investment and disposition of
funds, the safety and prudence of institution management, compliance
with the requirements of this chapter[,] and such other matters as the
commissioner may require.”120 The commissioner is authorized to revoke
a charter if the SPDI fails to comply with an adjudicated order or if the
application, charter, or other document submitted during the application
process contains a false statement or material misrepresentation or
omission.121 In addition, the commissioner is authorized to appoint a
conservator if it finds an SPDI has “failed” or is “operating in an unsafe
or unsound condition,” where such condition is not remedied. 122 The
statute defines “failed” or “failure” in this context as (1) a failure to
comply with the statute’s capital or liquidity requirements, (2) a failure
to maintain a required contingency account, or (3) a failure to meet its
obligations to depositors or customers “in the manner commonly
accepted by business practices[.]”123 The statute further defines the term
“unsafe or unsound condition” as a “circumstance” likely to result in (1)
the SPDI’s “failure,” (2) a “substantial dissipation of assets or earnings,”
(3) a substantial disruption of services to depositors, or (4) “[o]therwise
substantially prejudice the depository interests of depositors.” 124
E. Digital assets recognition.
In 2019, Wyoming clarified the legal status of digital assets
under Articles 8 and 9 of the UCC. The statute defines “digital asset”
broadly as “a representation of economic, proprietary or access rights
that is stored in a computer readable format,” and classifies three
categories under this definition: “digital consumer asset,” “digital
security,” and “virtual currency,” each of which has their own
definition.125
In addition, the bill authorized traditional banks to provide
“custodial services” of digital assets under specific conditions. 126 The
statute defines “custodial services” as “safekeeping and management of
customer currency and digital assets through the exercise of fiduciary
trust powers under this section as a custodian, and includes fund
administration and the execution of customer instructions.”127 Thus,
traditional banks in Wyoming may now offer custodial services for
crypto assets even if they are not chartered SPDIs. 128

120

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-12-119(c).
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COMPARISON OF STATE APPROACHES

While it would be premature to characterize one state’s
regulation of crypto as superior to another, what is clear is that the
different regulatory environments reflect, at least in part, competing
priorities between lawmakers that can significantly impact an industry
valued at an estimated $1.6 trillion.129 The crypto and blockchain
movement is driving innovation throughout the financial sector,
including banking, securities, and e-commerce.130 Crypto and related
platforms offer new ways to transact and access financial services around
the world at faster speeds and at lower cost without the need for
traditional intermediaries.131 The technology empowers users to transfer
and convert value across borders and Cryptocurrency and related
platforms seem poised to benefit emerging economies , where lack access
to traditional means of banking and other financial services. 132
New York’s adoption of the BitLicense regime was animated by
concerns about preventing fraud and criminal activity. 133 New York
opted to impose significant regulatory requirements that apply
depending on whether one is engaged in broadly defined “Virtual
Currency Business Activity,” which could conceivably include the
issuance of a single digital token.134 In doing so, however, New York
arguably discouraged entry by companies that may be wary of the
requirements or simply cannot afford to comply; the BitLicense regime
has faced criticism by those who have perceived it as imposing undue
compliance costs that stifle innovation—some of whom have relocated
to Wyoming.135 Mid-way through 2021, NYDFS had issued just 19
129

See Sophia Cai, Crypto-Savvy U.S. Senator Sees the Future in Wyoming, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26,
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Community Reacts to the NY BitLicense, COINTELEGRAPH (June 4, 2015),
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https://blog.kraken.com/post/253/farewell-new-york/ [ https://perma.cc/EE7M-TF2T]. Kraken
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licenses to entities other than chartered trust institutions since the
regulation was first implemented in 2015.136
Whereas Wyoming amended its money-transmitter statute to
exempt businesses engaged in the transmission of virtual currencies,
Washington amended its money-transmitter statute to specifically cover
them, providing just narrow exemptions for token-rewards programs and
online gaming tokens that have no secondary market or application
outside of the platform.137 Entities such as crypto exchanges subject to
the statute must comply with the law’s licensure and operational
requirements, some of which are analogous to the requirements imposed
under New York’s BitLicense regime.138 At the same time, Washington’s
DFI has aggressively enforced state securities laws against companies
conducting ICOs in a variety of contexts—a trend that can and should be
expected to continue in the absence of legislative guidance.139 While
Washington’s amendment of its money-transmitter law has faced
criticism similar to that of New York’s BitLicense, over 50 virtual
currency businesses have been licensed in the state, suggesting that
Washington’s money-transmitter regime is perceived as less
burdensome.140
Wyoming has taken an altogether different tact. Wyoming has
prioritized easing regulatory barriers as part of a deliberate strategy to
attract the growing crypto and blockchain industry to take root there. 141
This strategy was not undertaken by accident—Wyoming lawmakers
seized the opportunity to encourage cryptocurrency and blockchain
businesses to flock to their state by taking affirmative steps to clarify the
rules affecting the industry.142 While Wyoming has enacted several
measures to accomplish this, three stand out. Wyoming’s amended
Money Transmitter Act now exempts businesses engaged in virtual
currency transactions, where other states have imposed them. 143 In
enacting the Special Depository Institution Act Wyoming created a new
type of financial institution that is authorized to engage in traditional
banking activities using crypto assets.144 Wyoming’s Financial
Technology Sandbox Act enables companies developing an innovative
financial product or service to apply for and receive a waiver of certain
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regulations for up to two years.145 These and other laws epitomize
Wyoming’s forward-looking philosophy when it comes to
cryptocurrencies and related platforms, but still implement conditions
promoting meaningful oversight. Chartered SPDIs, for example, are
regulated by the state’s banking commissioner and are subject to
enhanced regulatory requirements in exchange for the right to lawfully
offer services traditionally offered by banks. SPDIs are subject to
specific capitalization and liquidity requirements and ongoing reporting
and examination requirements to maintain a license. 146 Entities that
receive a Financial Technology Sandbox exemption, in turn, can have
their authorization revoked if they violate the law, if the state determines
that continued testing of the innovative product or service is deemed
likely to harm consumers, or if the company experiences operational or
financial failure.147
The differences between Wyoming’s regulatory approach versus
that of New York’s reflect competing priorities that have produced
different legal and regulatory landscapes. Wyoming lawmakers have
passed laws that acknowledge the new technology’s disruptive capacity
and encourage the growing crypto industry to take root in the state by
reducing regulatory barriers.148 New York’s adoption of the BitLicense
regime, by contrast, was motivated by concerns about the crypto industry
enabling criminal and fraudulent activity.149 In many ways, Wyoming’s
experience thus far presents an alternative narrative to this earlydoomsday scenario. Wyoming has shown that it is possible to promote
innovation by fashioning creative ways of lessening regulatory barriers
to entry, while still maintaining the opportunity for meaningful
oversight. It has also shown that this approach can be an effective
strategy for attracting new business, even for states that may find
themselves on the periphery of advances in the technology sector.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Laws have consequences for any new industry. New York and
Wyoming’s different approaches to crypto regulation reflect competing
philosophies about regulating crypto in the financial sector. Wyoming
has committed to promoting innovation and related economic growth by
attempting to ease regulatory barriers to entry. New York, motivated by
deterring the risk of fraud or criminal activity, has imposed regulatory
barriers at the risk of losing businesses to other states. Time will tell
whether these different philosophies will drive permanent consequences.
New York’s status as the mecca of the U.S. financial industry may limit
its exposure to long-term consequences, but other states are not so
conveniently positioned. Regulators and lawmakers in other states and
on the federal level will have to decide how the balance between risk
145
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deterrence and fostering innovation is best struck in their own
jurisdictions.

